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Abstract
This article considers the neglected topic of the relationship between the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabil-
ities and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, with regard to the participation rights of disabled children. It analyses
key articles in both conventions and considers relevant general comments from both convention committees (the Com-
mittee on the Rights of the Child and the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities), and their interpretation
by academic contributors. The article argues that much work on this topic fails to develop an adequate understanding
of power relations, and that the ‘social model of disability’ which underpins the disabilities convention, when applied to
‘childhood’ (as opposed to ‘children’) suggests that the implications of that convention for the participation rights of all
children, not only disabled children, are profound. This is because the disabilities convention rejects the relevance of tests
of capacity and ‘best interests’ for disabled adults, for reasonswhich are equally germane to disabled children, and children
in general. The article concludes with discussion of the difficulties in implementing the insights derived from the analysis
of the disabilities convention in substantive law in the absence of a right to freedom from age discrimination for children,
and suggests other, less far-reaching, reforms that could be made this notwithstanding.
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1. Introduction
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child
(CRC; United Nations, 1989) was the first human rights
convention to contain an article dedicated to disability.
Article 23(1) seeks to ensure that disabled children enjoy
‘a full and decent life’ which includes ‘active participation
in the community’. Article 23(3) directs state parties to-
wards the goal of ensuring ‘the fullest possible social in-
tegration’ of disabled children. In addition, Article 2 gives
children a right to freedom from discrimination on vari-
ous grounds including disability. Generally, the ‘participa-
tion rights’ of disabled children should be factored in to
all actions, policies and decisions concerning or affecting
children (Committee on the Rights of the Child [CCRC],
2006, para. 5).
Since 2006, the position of disabled children has
been further enhanced by numerous provisions of the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities (CRPD; United Nations, 2006). The CRPD is
founded on the importance of ensuring participation for
disabled persons. Article 1 builds ‘full and effective par-
ticipation in society on an equal basis with others’ into
the convention’s definition of disability and Article 3(c)
provides that participation is one of the general princi-
ples running through the convention. Article 7, dedicated
to disabled children, incorporates the best interests test,
and the rights to be heard and have views taken into
account, found in Articles 3(1) and 12(1) CRC, as Arti-
cles 7(2) and (3) respectively. Article 7 both guides the
application of the rights found in that convention to chil-
dren and acts as a bridge between the CRPD and the
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CRC. Article 7(1) affirms that ‘States Parties shall take all
necessary measures to ensure the full enjoyment by chil-
dren with disabilities of all human rights and fundamen-
tal freedoms on an equal basis with other children’ (see
also preamble, para. (r)).
The interface between the CRC and the CRPD has
been subject to little critical analysis (Sabatello, 2013).
This may be because it is commonly understood that the
CRPD merely elaborates on the rights given to children
by the CRC, rather than providing new rights. I will ar-
gue, however, via an analysis which moves beyond is-
sues around the substantive content of rights and into
questions of paradigm and approach, that the potential
impact of the CRPD on the CRC is profound. This arises
from the adoption by the framers of the CRPD of what is
called a ‘social model’ approach to disability, which car-
ries within it a vision of participation which is incompati-
ble with both the substantive content and the underly-
ing ethos of the CRC, in terms of the latter’s construc-
tion of ‘the disabled child’ and ‘childhood’. I will first con-
sider how children’s participation has been discussed in
debates around CRC participation rights, suggesting that
these debates suffer from an impoverished understand-
ing of the relationship between participation and power.
I will then consider whether the social model approach
is more satisfactory in this regard, both in theory and in
terms of how it plays out in Article 12 CRPD, this being
that convention’s key article on participation rights. In
the final substantive section of the article I will focus on
the right to express a viewand, have it taken into account,
this being a cornerstone right for effective child partic-
ipation in both the CRC and the CRPD. I will conclude
that the main issue which the CRPD raises for the CRC is
whether a ‘social model of childhood’ should be adopted.
I argue that it should, although I concede that Rome was
not built in a day, and so end by suggesting other, less
contentious, changes that could be made to the way in
which the CRC is interpreted, whilst we patiently await
‘the dawn of a new era’ promised by Kofi Annan on the
day the CRPD came into existence (Bartlett, 2012).
2. Participation, Rights and Power
Although the rights contained in the CRC are integrated
and indivisible, impacting on and informing the scope
of each other, they are often categorised in terms of
the so-called ‘3Ps’, of protection, provision, and partic-
ipation. Protection and provision rights are rooted in
welfarist concerns—the survival of the child, protection
from harm or neglect, themeeting of needs, and the pro-
vision of services. Participation rights, by contrast, whilst
depending for their efficacy or even possibility on func-
tioning protection and provision rights, emphasise the
present and future autonomy and agency of the child. At
the risk of oversimplification, it can be said whilst protec-
tion and provision rights are concerned to secure the con-
ditions of possibility for a good and meaningful life, par-
ticipation rights in the CRC are concerned with living that
life, and seek to provide appropriately modified, child-
focussed, versions of traditional adult civil and political
rights to self-determination and involvement in the polis.
The provision of participation rights to children was one
of the great innovations introduced by the CRC.
Participation rights are possessed by individual chil-
dren, by groups of children—such as disabled children—
in respect of decisions which affect them, and by all chil-
dren collectively. They have both a social and political as-
pect, requiring that children be encouraged and enabled
to engage both in society, broadly understood, and in
democratic processes. Participation rights do not respect
the public/private divide, applying equally to parental or
other domestic decision-makers (albeit that here they
must interact with parental rights to raise their children
and guide their development provided by Articles 18
and 5) as to public actors and institutions in their deal-
ings with children. The single most significant participa-
tion right in the CRC is the Article 12 right to be heard
and have one’s views taken into account, considered by
the CCRC (2003, para. 12) to be one of the four general
principles (along with freedom from discrimination; up-
holding best interests; and the right to life, survival and
development) underpinning the CRC. Other ‘participa-
tion rights’ are phrased as freedoms: of expression (Arti-
cle 13); thought, conscience and religion (Article 14); and
association and peaceful assembly (Article 15).
Supporting these primary participation rights, are
rights to privacy (Article 16) and of access to media and
information (Article 17). Participation is also emphasised
as an aspect of other rights, such as the ‘right to partic-
ipate fully in cultural life and the arts’ provided by Arti-
cle 31, and specific groups are provided with bespoke
participation rights, including disabled children, as al-
ready mentioned (Article 23) and children belonging to
an indigenousminority (Article 30). Beyond this, the indi-
visibility of rights in the CRC means that all rights therein
are in some sense participation rights: the right to free-
dom from discrimination, for example, is designed to en-
sure equal participation opportunities for all; the idea
of best interests is swathed in normative assumptions
about the benefits of participation; and Article 12 and
the other rights listed above interact with other CRC
provisions such as the rights to the highest standard of
health (Article 24) and to education (Articles 28, 29).
The emergence of children’s participation rights re-
flected general trends such as consumerism and user
involvement, but also developments in the sociology
of childhood, with new paradigms of the child as au-
tonomous and capable replacing historical constructions
grounded in notions of dependency, lack and parental au-
thority (Tisdall, 2008; Sinclair, 2004), based on research
demonstrating the significant capacities of children. As
the CCRC notes in General Comment [GC] 12 (CCRC,
2009, para. 21), citing Lansdown (2005): ‘Research shows
that the child is able to form views from the youngest
age, even when she or he may be unable to express
them verbally’. Human rights discourse embraced and
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amplified these new constructions of the child as subject
(Thomas, 2007). This entails that the substantive content
of participation rights respect the autonomy of the child,
with ‘participation’ requiring somethingmore thanmere
involvement or consultation. Participation rights should
enable children to ‘learn how their views and those of
adults are taken into account and shape the outcome
of such processes’ (CCRC, 2009, para. 3), and ‘should
not only be a momentary act, but the starting point for
an intense exchange between children and adults on
the development of policies, programmes and measures
in all relevant contexts of children’s lives’ (CCRC, 2009,
para. 13).
Child participation is understood to offer present and
future benefits to the child or children concerned, in-
cluding enhanced life experiences, the development of
a sense of self-worth, and of capacities, confidence, and
so on. It is also said to mean ‘better outcomes, both
for young people and for organisations’ (Kirby, Lanyon,
Cronin, & Sinclair, 2003, p. 18). More generally, better
participation better upholds the legal rights of children
and the obligations of governments and other actors to-
wards them, and as such enhances democracy. Given this
multiplicity of aims, it is not always clear how the con-
cept of ‘successful’ participation should be understood.
Much effort has been expended on developing strate-
gies, policies, practices, and protocols designed to ac-
tualise, normalise and measure participation and par-
ticipation rights (Kirby et al., 2003; Lundy, 2007), such
as Hart’s ubiquitous adaptation of the ‘ladder of partici-
pation’ (Hart, 1992). And as far as ‘social’ participation
in contexts such as education, leisure or sport is con-
cerned, the notion of ‘well being’ has been shown to
be positively correlated to the efficacy of participation
rights (Lloyd & Emerson, 2016), so that greater levels
of ‘well being’—with social scientists devising ways to
measure changes—can be taken as indicative of more
or less successful projects to realise participation rights.
Things are trickier when it comes to political participa-
tion. The main mechanism used by adults—the right to
vote—is not available to children. There is a ‘participa-
tion gap’ which Nolan (2010, p. 768) sees as ‘deeply prob-
lematic’ because it ‘not only poses a serious obstacle to
the conceptualisation of children as full “citizens” but un-
dermines the legitimacy of the outputs of so-called rep-
resentative democratic decision-making bodies in rela-
tion to children’s rights issues’; and attempts have been
made, byNolan and others (Cohen, 2005), to deviseways
to address the democratic deficit which have involved de-
veloping the notion of citizenship in novel ways.
The absence of the right to vote in the CRC reflects
the reluctance of adult populations to share political
power with children, and this reluctance has frequently
been reported by research on participation in other con-
texts (VIPER, 2013). Concern has been expressed that too
often participation initiatives remain on the lower rungs
of Hart’s ladder of participation: ‘few’ of those studied
by Badham ‘showed any tangible results’ of participation
initiatives, and that ‘One of the reasons for this emerging
chasmbetween process and outcome is adult policymak-
ers’ and professionals’ lack of attention to power in par-
ticipation’ (Badham, 2004, p. 144), which tends towards
tokenism rather than genuine partnership as envisaged
by the CCRC. The issue here can be understood in terms
of the balance between autonomy and benevolence: par-
ticipation implies agency and, to some extent at least,
constitutes the displacement of benevolence—as well
as of adult power and authority over children. This is
certainly the view of the CCRC, which sees participa-
tion rights as needed by children to address ‘many long-
standing practices and attitudes, as well as political and
economic barriers’ (CCRC, 2009, para. 4). The relation-
ships involved are paradoxical, however. Arguments for
more and better participation are commonly addressed
not to children but to adults—national governments and
NGOs, health and education establishments, parents and
others—as the principal actors (Tisdall, 2008). Participa-
tion for children is seen to be ‘dependent on the cooper-
ation of adults’ (Lundy, 2007, p. 929). It is they whomust
give (some) power to children.
Whilst in one sense clearly correct, this sort of anal-
ysis endorses a model of power as a ‘thing’ over which
something like ownership rights can be held, and alien-
ated. I would rather align myself with Foucault, who
holds that, rather than being something which can be
possessed, power is better understood as something
which is exercised:
what defines a relationship of power is that it is a
mode of action which does not act directly and imme-
diately on others. Instead, it acts upon their actions:
an action upon an action, on existing actions or on
those which may arise in the present or the future.
(Foucault, 1983, p. 220)
This view has various implications: power is not seen in
abstract terms but rather as embedded in human rela-
tionships; it is diffuse and polycentred; alinear andmulti-
directional; and it should be studied in terms of effects
not intentions. Gallagher gives the example of the right
to vote in school council elections. What this actually
means depends, amongst other things, on numerous
pupil–pupil, pupil–teacher, pupil–school, and teacher–
school, relations. If any of these relations change ‘the
power which pupils are able to exercise will also be trans-
formed’ (Gallagher, 2008, p. 399). That adults have given
children in the school the right and power to vote, with
the intention of fostering participation in the running of
the school, is of little relevance to whether those inten-
tions are mirrored in their effects, and tells little about
the actual benefits, level, nature or intensity of the par-
ticipatory experience.
For Foucault, power understood in terms of ‘actions
upon actions’ is characteristic of the way that modern
government functions. The idea of good government ‘de-
pends not upon crushing the agency of subjects into sub-
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mission, but rather in cultivating this agency in particular
ways’ entailing a ‘subtle interplay between the hierarchi-
cal, coercive power of the governor over the governed,
and the governed subject’s power over herself, which
we might call her autonomy’ (Gallagher, 2008, p. 401).
Modern government aims to construct subjects who are
amenable tomodern government (Foucault, 2007, p. 99).
For example, whilst Article 28 CRC provides a right to edu-
cation for all children, Article 29 requires state parties to
operate their education systems so as to both develop
the personality, talents, abilities, and capacities of the
child to their fullest potential, and to prepare children
‘for responsible life in a free society’. That is, the aims of
education include the production of autonomous adult
citizens who will share the vision of good government
and who, as good, responsible, citizens, will themselves
be governable. The risk of government, however, when
it is the government of freedom, is that freedom will ex-
ceed its allocated place. The autonomous subject, edu-
cated by the state to be a good and governable citizen,
might exercise that autonomy to resist governance. As
Foucault puts it, ‘there are no relations of power without
resistances’ and resistance ‘exists all themore by being in
the same place as power; hence, like power, resistance is
multiple’ (Foucault, 1980, 142). From such a perspective,
notions of power based on ownership or possession, and
which see it as alienable, seem hopelessly inadequate
to capture all the competing and conflicting actions and
flows which together constitute the operation of power
and resistance in modern societies, and limit our ability
fully to evaluate the risks and benefits of participation
rights for disabled children.
Although Foucault has applied his ideas to the gov-
ernance of children (Foucault, 2006, ch. 9), more work
is needed to think through the ways in which ideas prin-
cipally concerned with the governance of adult popula-
tions might function in the context of children’s rights.
As contemporary, human rights-grounded, discourses of
childhood embrace notions of autonomy and agency,
and outlaw control strategies using physical force, it is
perhaps to be expected that strategies to encourage com-
pliance in adult populations are also now also utilised
for child populations. Moreover, Foucault’s model of the
modern operation of power—which he sees as being, ini-
tially at least, derived from the power of a father over
his family (Foucault, 2007, pp. 94–95)—suggests that par-
ents should be seen as part of the governmental struc-
ture regulating the autonomyof children (Articles 5, 18.1,
CRC). From this perspective, participation rights function
as a mechanism to include children in their own gov-
ernance, as a strategy for neutralising threats to gover-
nance (Gallagher, 2008, p. 402). Conversely, participa-
tion rights, especially the right to express a view and
have it taken into account, impact on parental as much
as state exercises of power. Such questions can be the-
orised, but their answers cannot. As mentioned above,
the operation of power should be studied in terms of its
effects rather than the intentions behind its deployment.
Answers to questions about how participation works in
practice involve the study of outcomes, of effects, and
are strictly within the realm of the empirical, as the study
of actions, and actions on actions.
3. The Social Model of Disability, Children, and
Childhood
The CRPD has, since 2006, provided disabled children
with further participation rights. The CRPD is a good ex-
ample of the revolution which has overwhelmed tradi-
tional concepts of disability, with the emergence of the
so-called ‘social model’ of disability. The social model,
the exact contours of which are contested (Gabel &
Peters, 2004), involves a rejection of both the ‘medi-
cal model’ which locates disability as an inherent, prob-
lematic quality of the individual; and the ‘social wel-
fare model’, which sees social policy in terms of charity
and philanthropy towards people with ‘special needs’. In-
stead, it is a model grounded in equality, rights, and their
infringement (Kanter, 2015). Social models of disability
conceptualise disability as resulting from various barriers
to participation that society places in the way of persons
with impairments. The removal of these barriers is the
mission of the social model and disability rights.
The emergence of the social model of disability has
spawned a broad literature. Some criticise it as too all-
encompassing and at risk of denying the subjective ex-
perience of being a disabled child (Watson, 2012, pp.
194–195). Others argue that the model must be mod-
ified accordingly, and make a distinction between ‘dis-
ability’ (a social/cultural phenomenon which is the re-
sult of barriers placed by society in the way of participa-
tion) and ‘impairments effects’ (the limitations which in-
dividuals experience which are ‘directly associated with
or “caused by” having a physical, sensory or intellec-
tual impairment’) (Thomas, 1999, p. 42). Those who de-
fend the model, including some closely associated with
its emergence, are content to accept such views, mak-
ing the point that the social model never sought to be-
come ‘an all-encompassing framework within which ev-
erything that happens to disabled people could be un-
derstood or explained’ (Oliver, 2013, p. 1024). It is a
modified version of the social model which underpins
the CRPD. Article 1 defines ‘disability’ (although not ex-
haustively) as ‘long-term physical, mental, intellectual or
sensory impairments which in interaction with various
barriers may hinder their full and effective participation
in society on an equal basis with others’, and para. (e)
of the preamble refers to ‘attitudinal and environmen-
tal barriers’.
Although little work has yet done on the applica-
tion of the social model of disability to disabled children,
various supportive critiques have emphasised that it
can accommodate a broad constituency of differentially-
situated stake-holders (Shakespeare & Watson, 1997,
pp. 298–299). The Committee on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities (CCRPD) has not addressed the question
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directly, but evidently does not see a problem, applying
the social model to barriers to education, play, and sport
in its GC 4 (CCRPD, 2016, para. 58). Connors and Stalker
(2007) have sought to measure the relative importance
to disabled children of external barriers and internal im-
pairments, which the authors (Connors & Stalker, 2007,
p. 31) and others (Watson, 2012, p. 196) understand as
constituting the application of the social model to dis-
abled children.
However, there is a need for clarity on this issue, in-
volving a vital distinction between the application of the
social model to children, and to ‘childhood’. In their re-
search, Connors and Stalker (2007) apply the model to
children. But merely asking what barriers stand in the
way of disabled children’s participation does not capture
the full implications of the model, because it leaves the
concept of childhood untouched. The social model is con-
cerned with more than challenging barriers to participa-
tion. It also involves a critique of ‘disability’ as an exercise
of power, which holds:
(i) that the benevolence of both the medical and
social welfare models mask their operation as
power and control, and the imposition of the value-
judgments of the decision-maker (Banner, 2012; Hol-
royd, 2012), such that the CCRPD for this reason in-
sists (CCRPD, 2014, para. 21) that the ‘best interests
principle’ is not CRPD-compliant (see further below);
(ii) that earlier models endorsed an inappropriate, in-
dividualising, focus to understanding disability; and
(iii) that the concept of ‘autonomy’ as that term func-
tions in liberal discourses is ‘by and large a fiction’
(Mégret, 2008, p. 513) because it underplays the ex-
tent to which individual autonomy is achievable only
through social and other relations.
Here, the social model overlaps with other provocative
developments, including Fineman’s vulnerability theory
(Fineman, 2008), Nussbaum’s work on the ‘capabilities
approach’ (Harnacke, 2013), and feminist and otherwork
on the concept of ‘relational autonomy’ (e.g.,Mackenzie,
2014; Series, 2015). Space precludes further discussion,
but it is important to appreciate that the social model
of disability is embedded in a broader project to decon-
struct the autonomous subject so central to liberal polit-
ical and legal theories.
The CRPD is premised on the view that all persons re-
quire support to be free and autonomous, which both
serves to dissolve any firm barrier, such as that be-
tween ‘able’ and ‘disabled’; (or, significantly, although
the CCRPD does not mention this) that between adult
and child. In international law terms, the challenge is to
the barrier between, on the one hand, civil and politi-
cal rights, exercised by an autonomous subject, and, on
the other, economic, social and cultural rights, essential
for the realisation in practice of effective civil and polit-
ical rights, which involves ‘a profound process of refor-
mulating rights’ (Mégret; 2008, p. 515). Sometimes de-
scribed as a ‘support paradigm’ (Series, 2015, p. 80), this
is the model embedded in the CRPD, and there has been
to date ‘a general failure to understand that the human
rights-based model of disability implies a shift from the
substitute decision-making paradigm toone that is based
on supported decision-making’ (CCRPD, 2014, para. 3).
The difference between the two paradigms is that the
latter posits the individual concerned, seen as having le-
gal capacity, as the decision-maker, whereas the former
removes the decision from an individual found to lack ca-
pacity, typically via an inappropriate conflation of legal
and mental capacity (CCRPD, 2014, para. 15), and hands
it to a third party, to be made by reference to that third
party’s assessment of the best interests of the individual
concerned. This seen by the CCRPD as discriminatory and
antithetical to the participation rights of disabled per-
sons (CCRPD, 2014, paras. 13, 45).
Applying this model to children entails seeing ‘child-
hood’ in the sameway as ‘disability’—as a set of legal and
other limitations imposed on the subject, over and above
those resulting from, or irrespective of, their present indi-
vidual abilities and capacities. This is not to impute sinis-
ter motives to adults; nor to challenge the validity or pro-
priety of theCRC’s vision of childhood as ideally occurring
‘in a family environment, in an atmosphere of happiness,
love and understanding’ (CRC, preamble); nor to dismiss
the historical and continuing importance of the CRC in
and of itself, precisely for the way in it constructs chil-
dren’s legal personality in the discourse of rights (Free-
man, 2011). But it is to recognise that childhood, and
the CRC as the legal expression of normative discourses
of childhood, can be understood as: regulatory devices
which produce normative judgments about children and
child development (Gadda, 2008); systematic discrimina-
tion based on age; disempowerment; and as such, as bar-
riers to participation. In short, it can be argued that child-
hood is in effect a species of disability, in the specific
sense in which that latter term is deployed by the social
model and the CRPD. The social model, accordingly, bites
twice on the disabled child; once because she is a child
and again because she is disabled. Its application to child-
hood involves asking questions about how power flows
through discourses and actions around both childhood
and disability, and their various intersections; how this
power is constitutive of individuals, as in some sense the
effects of power; and how it might be acted on by or for
the benefit of disabled children. That is, the social model
should be seen as an analysis of power relations rather
than as a theory of disability.
The social model of disability was strongly endorsed
by the CCRC in its CG 9 (CCRC, 2006, para. 5), meaning
in the view of the committee that ‘the barrier is not the
disability itself but rather a combination of social, cul-
tural, attitudinal and physical obstacles which disabled
children encounter in their daily lives’. Correspondingly,
‘The strategy for promoting [the] rights [of disabled chil-
dren] is therefore to take the necessary action to remove
those barriers’ (CCRC, 2006, para, 5). This is uncontrover-
Social Inclusion, 2017, Volume 5, Issue 3, Pages 93–103 97
sial as far as it goes, but as can be seen, to understand
the social model only in terms of ‘barriers’ misses the
broader, andmore politically challenging, implications of
a social model approach and how it might apply to dis-
abled children. Specifically, the CCRC does not to recog-
nise that one significant barrier confronting disabled chil-
dren, and children generally, is the social, and legal, con-
struction of childhood itself. The denial of the franchise
to children is perhaps the clearest example of the point.
As I will now discuss, this argument is supported by an
analysis of the role that capacity plays in the construc-
tion of the child and her rights in and by the CRC, as it
is here that the CRPD decisively parts company with the
CRC, and the ‘best interests’ approach.
4. Children, Capacity and Supported Decision-Making
in the CRPD
The stance taken on the issue of capacity in the CPRD is
ground-breaking and controversial. The key provision is
Article 12. Articles 12(1)–(3) provide:
1. States Parties reaffirm that persons with disabilities
have the right to recognition everywhere as persons
before the law;
2. States Parties shall recognize that persons with dis-
abilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with
others in all aspects of life;
3. States Parties shall take appropriate measures
to provide access by persons with disabilities to
the support they may require in exercising their le-
gal capacity.
Article 12, like the CRPD generally, is grounded in an
understanding that the key issues to be addressed are
the historical inequalities between the rights of disabled
adults compared to non-disabled adults, and discrimi-
nation against disabled persons (Dhanda, 2007). What
makes it controversial is its challenge to the status quo.
It seems to prohibit the use of any test of capacity which
is linked to, or triggered by, a person’s disability:
Legal capacity and mental capacity are distinct con-
cepts. Legal capacity is the ability to hold rights and
duties (legal standing) and to exercise those rights and
duties (legal agency). It is the key to accessing mean-
ingful participation in society. Mental capacity refers
to the decision-making skills of a person, which natu-
rally vary from one person to another and may be dif-
ferent for a given person depending on many factors,
including environmental and social factors…Under ar-
ticle 12 of the Convention, perceived or actual deficits
inmental capacitymust not be used as justification for
denying legal capacity. (CCRPD, 2014, para. 13)
The insistence that all persons have legal capacity is but-
tressed by the CCRPD with a corresponding reading of
Article 12(3) as requiring supported decision-making as
the norm, and the ‘abolition’ of substituted judgment ap-
proaches. There is no room for compromise: ‘The devel-
opment of supported decision-making systems in paral-
lel with the maintenance of substitute decision-making
regimes is not sufficient to comply with article 12 of
the Convention’ (CCRPD, 2014, para. 28). However, the
CCRPD does accept that Article 12(4), which requires
state parties to provide ‘appropriate and effective safe-
guards to prevent abuse’ when providing support to a
person in the exercise of their legal capacity, does per-
mit a substituted judgment to bemade ‘Where, after sig-
nificant efforts have been made, it is not practicable to
determine the will and preferences of an individual’. But
even here, the task of the decision-maker is to do their
best to implement the ‘will and preferences’ of the per-
son in question, rather than make their own decision as
to that person’s best interests (CCRPD, 2014, para. 21).
A detailed examination of debates around Article 12
is beyond the scope of the present article, but in sum-
mary, most CRPD scholars are supportive, even enthusi-
astic about, the approach taken in the CRPD and by the
CCRPD in GC 1 (Arstein-Kerslake & Flynn, 2016). How-
ever, Richardson, herself broadly supportive, has noted
(2012, p. 346), that the apparent contradiction in the
CCRPD view—in seeing Articles 12(1)–(3) as providing
that all persons have legal capacity, but conceding that
Article 12(4) suggests otherwise—is hard to reconcile.
Others are sanguine about the impact of the convention
on domestic capacity law, and see GC 1 as a missed op-
portunity to clarify key issues, including the relation be-
tween Articles 12(1)–(3) and Art 12(4) (Dawson, 2015).
Others still see the issue in temporal terms, of how to
implement fundamental change to laws, practices and
attitudes (Harnacke, 2013), given that ‘sufficiently devel-
oped concepts and legislative models are not in place for
legal reform to reflect the new paradigm’ (Bartlett, 2014,
p. 173), whilst making existing mechanisms function ef-
fectively to protect rights in the meantime.
Despite these uncertainties, it must be considered
whether Article 12—in applying to ‘all persons with dis-
abilities’ (Article 1, CRPD), and given that ‘legal capacity
is a universal attribute inherent in all persons by virtue of
their humanity’ (CCRPD, 2014, para. 8)—should be taken
to include children. The CCRPD’s view is that ‘best inter-
ests’ tests, as disempowering and discriminatory, do not
comply with Article 12 when applied to adults (CCRPD,
2014, para, 21), but as far as disabled children are con-
cerned, the rights approach of Article 12 is subordinate
to the ‘best interests’ approach of Article 7:
While article 12 of the Convention protects equality
before the law for all persons, regardless of age, ar-
ticle 7 of the Convention recognizes the developing
capacities of children and requires that ‘in all actions
concerning children with disabilities, the best inter-
ests of the child…be a primary consideration’ (para. 2)
and that ‘their views [be] given due weight in accor-
dance with their age and maturity’ (para. 3). To com-
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ply with article 12, States parties must examine their
laws to ensure that the will and preferences of chil-
dren with disabilities are respected on an equal basis
with other children. (CCRPD, 2014, para. 36)
This statement is, however, more ambiguous than it ap-
pears. On the one hand, it appears that the CCRPD has
done what it censures in others—it recognises that dis-
abled children have the right to equality before the law,
but does not allowdisabled children to exercise that right.
The principle of non-discrimination should preclude a sit-
uation whereby disabled adults are entitled to greater
levels of support than disabled children, yet this would
seem to be the effect of children being steered away
from Article 12 and into Article 7 by the CCRPD. Having
stated that legal capacity tests allowing substituted judg-
ment by third parties do not comply with the convention,
the CCRPD here not only defends the use of a legal capac-
ity test, but the most discredited version of such; a test
based on ‘status’, which it specifically disapproves in re-
lations to disabled adults (CCRPD, 2014, para. 15). The
paradigm shift occurring around the concept of disabil-
ity as reflected in the CRPD is not, it seems, in view of
the CCRPD intended to apply to disabled children.
And yet, the reference to ‘thewill and preferences’ of
disabled children points otherwise. In GC 1, the CCRPD
states that ‘The “will and preferences” paradigm must
replace the “best interests” paradigm to ensure that
persons with disabilities enjoy the right to capacity on
an equal basis with others’ (CCRPD, 2014, para. 21),
Here, the CCRPD uses the term ‘will and preferences
paradigm’ as simply another way of describing the sup-
ported decision-making paradigm, as a key aspect of the
social model of disability: in the social model, the pur-
pose of support is to assist the supported person to ar-
ticulate their will and preferences in the form of deci-
sions. In using the same term when discussing the situ-
ation of disabled children, and in the same breath as it
refers to the best interests paradigm, the CCRPD seems,
then, to have conflated the old and new paradigms, con-
structing disabled children as a moment of difference in
personhood, allegedly protected but also not protected
by Art.12. It is submitted that this is inconsistent with the
philosophy of the CPRD. This can be seen most clearly
in the way that the participation rights of disabled chil-
dren to express views and have them taken into account
are differentially constructed in the CPRD compared to
the CRC.
5. The Right to Express Views and Have Them Taken
into Account
This right is found in both conventions. Article 12(1) CRC
provides:
States Parties shall ensure to the child who is capable
of forming his or her own views the right to express
those views freely on all matters affecting the child,
the views of the child being given due weight in accor-
dance with the age and maturity of the child.
Article 7(3) CRPD is similar, but imposes greater obliga-
tions on state parties:
States Parties shall ensure that children with disabili-
ties have the right to express their views freely on all
matters affecting them, their views being given due
weight in accordance with their age and maturity, on
an equal basis with other children, and to be provided
with disability and age-appropriate assistance to real-
ize that right.
As can be seen, Article 7(3) contains three modifications
of the Article 12(1) CRC right. First, Article 7(3) unlike Ar-
ticle 12(1) refers to equality between disabled children
and other children, implying that Article 7(3) is correc-
tive (designed to buttress the rights that disabled chil-
dren already possess under the CRC) rather than novel
(designed to provide new rights). Secondly, the reference
to capacity to form a view is absent from Article 7(3). It
could be suggested that nothing turns on this because
a view which has not been formed cannot be expressed.
It can perhaps more plausibly be argued, however, that
this is indicative of the general attitude of hostility to-
wards ‘capacity’ tests which runs through CRPD, as dis-
cussed above.
The third difference, that Article 7(3) CRPD unlike Ar-
ticle 12(1) CRC requires disabled children to be ‘provided
with disability and age-appropriate assistance’, further
contradicts the claim that the CRPD is merely corrective.
The right to express a view on matters which affect one,
and to have that view given due weight, is essentially a
civil right grounded in the state’s obligation to comply
with natural justice, and as such imposes ‘a strict obliga-
tion to undertake appropriate measures to fully imple-
ment this right for children’ (CCRC, 2009, para. 19, dis-
cussing Article 12(1) CRC). But the right to assistance in
the realization of that right, guaranteed by Art.7(3) CRPD,
is an entitlement or ‘social’ right, and the obligation on
states in respect of such rights is that they need be pro-
vided for only ‘to themaximum of its available resources’
(Article 4(2) CRPD, see also Article 4 CRC). In conven-
tional international human rights law terms, Art.7(3), by
conflating the two types of right, and subordinating the
latter to the former, undermines the distinction made by
Article 4(2) CRPD and Article 4 CRC. There is no doubt,
however, that this mixing of ‘types’ of rights, which is a
feature not just of Article 7(3), but of the CRPD generally,
was intentional, reflecting the social model approach to-
wards rights (Dhanda, 2008;Mégret, 2008;Weller, 2011).
As such, it is submitted that the best reading of Arti-
cle 7(3) is that it rejects the relevance of capacity and ap-
plies a supported decision-making approach to the par-
ticipation rights of disabled children.
It is unfortunate that the CCRC did not analyse or
even refer to Article 7(3) in either GC 9 (2006), dealing
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with the rights of disabled children, or GC 12 (2009), deal-
ing with Article 12 CRC rights. In GC 9, the CCRC does
state that compliance with Article 12(1) requires that dis-
abled children ‘should be represented in various bodies
such as parliament, committees and other forumswhere
theymay voice views and participate in themaking of de-
cisions that affect them as children in general and as chil-
dren with disabilities specifically’ (CCRC, 2006, para. 32).
The CCRC also notes with concern that disabled children
are too often not consulted about decisions to remove
them from their family environment and place themelse-
where (CCRC, 2006, para. 48), and urges states to com-
ply with Article 12(1) in this context. But other topics—
health, education, juvenile justice, civil rights and free-
doms, sport and leisure, and others—are discussed with-
out any reference to the rights in Article 12(1) or how
they might apply, and there is little discussion of the
rights of individual disabled children. Overall, GC 9 is very
much protectionist in tone.
The Article 12 CRC rights of children are also consid-
ered in GC 12. Although as a General Comment it is ap-
propriate that it deals with generalities, nonetheless it
is striking that the position of disabled children is barely
mentioned. The CCRC does state that disabled children
should be ‘equipped with, and enabled to use, any mode
of communication necessary to facilitate the expression
of their views’ (CCRC, 2009, para. 21), but beyond that,
disabled children are only referenced, along with indige-
nous children or very young children, as examples of sub-
sets of childrenwho have a group right to be heard under
Article 12 or for whom particular considerations apply to
state plans for the implementation of Article 12 rights
(CCRC, 2009, paras, 9, 87). And as seen above, the par-
ticipation rights of disabled children are dealt with only
summarily by the CCRPD in its GC 1.
In summary, the participation rights of disabled chil-
dren have not been clarified by either committee. The
CCRC has taken an approach in line with the ethos of the
CRC, viewing the Article 12 rights of all children as never
amounting to the right to self-determination enjoyed by
all adults. This is evident in its reading of the relationship
between Articles 3(1) and 12(1) CRC. The CCRC sees ‘no
tension’ between the two articles, but ‘only a comple-
mentary role of the two general principles’. Article 12(1)
is ‘the methodology for reaching the goal of hearing ei-
ther the child or the children’, whereas Article 3(1) ‘es-
tablishes the objective of achieving the best interests of
the child’ (CCRC, 2009, para. 74). From a Foucauldian
perspective, Articles 3(1) and 12(1) can be seen as ‘ac-
tions on actions’, and themethodological errorwhich the
CCRCmakes is to view the intention behind these actions
as determinative of their effects. Although in practice
there will often be no tension involved in applying the
two articles together, sometimes there will be. And this
tension is fundamental: it is the tension between con-
trol and resistance, benevolence and autonomy. This is
not to deny that a dispute can be resolved, for example
whether a child’s view is determinative of the outcome
or not. But the resolution of the tension, irrespective of
the CCRC’s view, can and will only be achieved on a case
by case, individualised basis, and it will be a question
of the particular configuration of actions upon actions,
the flows of power which can be brought to bear, in the
particular situation. A child well-equipped with rhetori-
cal and diplomatic skills, or unusual reserves of determi-
nation and belligerence, may secure a more favourable
outcome from her encounter with adults than her less
well-equipped peer, for example. But the point is that,
whilst the nature of tension may be theorised, its reso-
lution can only be achieved in practice and the play of
actions upon actions. However, the CCRC does not even
concede the (prior) stage of recognising a tension in the
first place.
For the CCRC, like the CCRPD, there is never a point at
which a child, however ‘mature’ and capacious, may de-
cide on his or her own best interests in a way in which rel-
evant adults disapprove (see, e.g., CCRC, 2009, paras. 29,
30), which leads to the conclusion that the participation
rights of children are at root mechanisms for governance
rather than autonomy, or the incremental recognition of
autonomy is itself a mechanism for governance. Hence,
the CCRC is inaccurate when it claims that ‘age alone
cannot determine the significance of the child’s views’
(CCRC, 2009, para. 29), because it is precisely age, and
status as a child, which justifies this approach to partici-
pation. The CCRC is only able to reach this view by mak-
ing no more than a passing and token reference to the
social model of disability, the CRPD, its attempts to shift
the paradigm around participation, and the implications
of that, not just for disabled children, but for all children
and, especially, the concept of childhood itself.
6. Concluding Comments
‘Participation’ entails engagement in relationships which
are shot through with power dynamics, and hence there
is a need to analyse participation rights as embroiled in
this play of actions on actions. I have argued that much
work on child participation has been hindered by the fail-
ure to do this. I further argued that the social model
of disability, itself a critique of power relations around
disability, functions similarly when applied to childhood,
as opposed to children; revealing childhood itself, like
disability, to be a constructed set of barriers to partici-
pation. Childhood, generally and in the CRC, may, and
should, be constructed positively, recognising and cele-
brating the inherent worth, dignity, autonomy and devel-
oping abilities of the child. But it also encodes a set of nor-
mative assumptions about incapacity, dependency, irra-
tionality, immaturity, which cloak the disempowerment
of children thereby achieved with an appearance of jus-
tificatory adult benevolence and responsibility. It is only
by acting on those assumptions that the CCPRD is able
simultaneously to disapprove the application of tests of
legal capacity and best interests achieved through substi-
tuted judgment for adults whilst finding no fault in their
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continued application to disabled children, and children
in general. It is nonetheless striking that the CCRPD em-
phatically rejects and blithely endorses the use of legal
capacity in the same breath.
TenBroek (2009, p. 39) has suggested that ‘the main
value of the [CRPD]…is that it forces us to face the con-
tradiction between the “myth system” and “operation
system” of our laws’. TenBroek’s point concerns equal-
ity between adults, but it applies equally to the gap be-
tween the myth of equal protection of the laws and the
reality of inadequate protection of disabled children, and
children in general. The problem, though, from a legal
point of view, is the absence of tools to make such an
argument. The CRPD offers only protection from discrim-
ination on the grounds of disability. The CRC also offers
children protection from discrimination on the grounds
of disability, as well as the other grounds in Article 2.
But what is missing, from this point of view, is an ex-
plicit right to protection from discrimination on grounds
of age. In a sense, the entirety of the CRC and the con-
cept of children’s rights recognises and seeks systemat-
ically to address age-related discrimination against chil-
dren, andArticle 2, whilst listing specific heads of discrim-
ination, is non-exhaustive, applying broadly to ‘discrimi-
nation of any kind’ or based on any ‘other status’ of the
child, whichwould seem to include the status of the child
as child, that is, age-related discrimination (although the
‘other status’ component was intended to protect, for ex-
ample, children born to unmarried parents: Buck, 2011,
p. 125). To date, however, although Article 2 has subse-
quently been expanded in scope, and is now seen as pro-
hibiting discrimination based on unlisted factors such as
sexuality, or HIV status, for example, there has been little
appetite to develop this possibility (Besson, 2011, p. 103;
Breen, 2005). Indeed, it is common to see Article 2(1) dis-
cussed with no reference made to the possibility that it
applies to age-based discrimination. But without such a
right, attempts to implement the social model of child-
hood in the sense developed in this essay cannot get off
the ground.
It may well be (thought) futile to develop a position
on the participation rights of disabled children which
questions the relevance of capacity and the best inter-
ests approach. There is little prospect of, and little sup-
port for, any such position (although it is not too long
since the same could be said in the context of the rights
of disabled persons). But less fundamental reform may
be more palatable. Specifically, it is argued that the con-
tinued reliance on a ‘status’ approach to capacity, which
holds that all below the age of 18, whatever their actual
capacity, may not exercise their own rights when a third
party disagrees as to their best interests, is not defensi-
ble. If international child law is not (yet) prepared to fol-
low international disability law in abandoning tests of le-
gal capacity and substituted judgment in favour of univer-
sal legal capacity and supported decision-making, then it
can at least abandon the ‘status’ approach to capacity in
favour of the ‘functional’ approach.
There should be a corresponding shift from substi-
tuted judgment to supported decision-making in the ex-
ercise of capacity. The explanation of the relationship be-
tween Articles 7 and 12 CPRD as they apply to children
offered by the CCRPD does not preclude the application
of the Art 12(3) right to supported decision-making to
disabled children. Franklin and Sloper (2009, p. 13) have
observed that knowledge regarding supported decision-
making for adults ‘has remained rather polarised from
that of children’s participation’, and more recently the
VIPER (2013) research reached the same conclusion. Sup-
ported decision-making should be the ideal for all chil-
dren, but there is extra support for taking this approach
to disabled children in the requirements imposed on
state parties by Article 7(3) CRPD. AsWeller (2011, p. 77)
has argued in the context of mental health, there is a
need for a ‘culture of supported decision-making’ in the
context of children’s disability rights. This would at least
be a move in the right direction.
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